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Yield-Spread Premiums:
Who's Working For the Borrower?
HUD's Erroneous Regulation and Its Bar
on Plaintiffs
Taiesha L. Cantwell*

INTRODUCTION
Beatrice Hiers was approved for a Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage of $159,750.'
Although
Countrywide offered her a seven and a half percent fixed-rate
mortgage, she opted to go with Homebuyers Mortgage Company,
for what she thought was a seven percent fixed-rate mortgage. 2 At
closing, she was told that the mortgage was adjustable-rate. 3 The
4
compensation paid to the mortgage broker totaled $10,004.45.
Ms. Hiers paid $5,282.87 in out-of-pocket costs; $4,538.87 of the
5
total compensation was in the form of a yield-spread premium.
6
No one disclosed the yield-spread premium to Ms. Hiers.
Astonishingly, Ms. Hiers actually qualified for the same loan with
a lower interest rate and without the broker's yield-spread

* B.A. 1998, Cornell University. J.D. expected 2004, University of Minnesota Law

School. Professor Ann M. Burkhart and all the JLI Staff, especially Krisann
Kleibacker, were invaluable. Thank you to Beverly Cantwell and Maya Clarke.
And, a very special thank you to Aaron McBroom. Mr. McBroom and I hope to
become home-owners one day.

1. HUD Policy Statement on Yield-Spread Premiums Suffers Another District
Court Snub in 'Culpepper' Class Action, INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, July 2, 1999,
at 3.
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. Id.
See discussion, infra, Part L.A (explaining the mortgage broker
compensation system and yield-spread premiums). A yield-spread premium occurs
when the borrower is charged a higher interest rate than what the lender is
offering. See id. The excess is given to the mortgage borker as a form of indirect
compensation. See id.

6. Senate Banking Committee Hearing on PredatoryMortgage Lending Practices:
Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (statement of Ms. Beatrice
Hiers), at http://banking.senate.gov/02-Olhrg/010802/hiers.htm [hereinafter Hiers]
("[Hlad I known that Homebuyers had secured for me a mortgage with an above
par interest rate, I would have secured other financing.").
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premium. 7 Sadly, Beatrice Hiers is the type of borrower who
becomes weighed-down by a yield-spread premium: minority and
female.8
Congress has passed legislation designed to protect borrowers
like Beatrice Hiers from paying "kickbacks and unearned fees."9
This Note contends that the rules promulgated by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with respect to yieldspread premiums 0 and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act" run contrary to congressional purpose and intended result.
The statute's language explicitly makes referral fees illegal, but
allows fees for services actually rendered. 12 Given this dichotomy,

7. Id. ("Irwin's [the lending company] rate sheet, in fact, shows that I qualified for
the same loan at about a 5.5% interest rate with no Yield Spread Premium to the
broker.").
8. See Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending
Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (statement of
David Donaldson), at http://banking.senate.gov/02_Olhrg/01O802/dnldson.htm
[hereinafter Donaldson]. David Donaldson is the attorney for the plaintiffs in the
Culpepper cases, discussed infra Part C.2 (analyzing the Culpepper cases' challenge
of the legality of yield-spread premiums). Donaldson referred to a test by the
Urban Institute as proof that African-Americans and Hispanics "tend to pay higher
YSP's [yield-spread premiums] than whites and that women pay more than men."
Id. (citing THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT MORTGAGE LENDING
(1999),
available
at
DISCRIMINATION
IN
AMERICA
34-35
Donaldson also
www.hud.govllibrary/bookshelfl8/pressrel/newsconf/menu.html.
stated that "[a]fter spending five years of looking at numerous borrowers' closing
documents it is clear to me that borrowers who are black, femal& or Hispanic pay
higher total broker 'compensation' than white males." Id.
9. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2002)
(prohibiting kickbacks and unearned fees in the context of real estate settlement
procedures).
10. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Statement of Policy
1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,080
(Mar. 1, 1999) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500) [hereinafter HUD Policy Statement
1]. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1:
Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to
Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b),
66 Fed. Reg. 53,052 (Oct. 18, 2001) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500) [hereinafter
HUD Policy Statement II].
11. 12 U.S.C. § 2607.
12. The statute reads:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing
of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise,
that business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service
involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person.
Id. at § 2607(a). The qualification to the general prohibition on kickbacks and
unearned fees reads:
Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting (1) the payment of
(C) by a lender to its duly appointed agent for services actually
a fee ...
performed in the making of a loan, (2) the payment to any person of a bona
fide salary or compensation or other payment for goods or facilities
actually furnished or for services actually performed.
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the hard issue for both HUD and the courts has been how to
determine the legality of yield-spread premiums given this
The legality of yield-spread premiums is an
dichotomy. 13
especially onerous issue because most borrowers are simply not
aware that they are paying a higher interest rate only so that their
14
mortgage broker can get paid more.
Part I of this Note will detail the HUD rulemakings, as well
as court rulings, surrounding yield-spread premiums.' 5 Studies
have shown that yield-spread premiums disproportionately impact
minority borrowers and, importantly, are part of the debate on
predatory lending. 16 Part II of this Note will explain the illogic of
HUD's "total compensation" test and why class litigation should
not be barred. 17 This "total compensation" test results in an
"individual look" to plaintiff suits that effectively creates a bar to
potential plaintiffs.' 8 The current test for the legality of yieldspread premiums as promulgated by HUD is part of the problem of
abusive loan practices. 19 Further, this Note suggests licensing
arrangements for the mortgage broker that will create a suitability
requirement and a fiduciary relationship with the borrower. 20 In
Part III, this Note explains that mortgage brokers should not go
uncompensated for services performed. 21 Rather, the yield-spread
premium should be properly attributable by the borrower as
payment to the mortgage broker for origination and servicing fees,
not as part of the risk assessment inherent in the loan interest
22
rate.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Mortgage Broker Compensation System
At least half of all residential mortgages are originated by

Id. at § 2607(c).
13. See discussion, infra, Part I.C-D (detailing HUD's various rulemakings,
differing court interpretations, and the HUD Proposed Rule).
14. See infra note 39 (detailing testimony of two borrowers who were unaware
they were paying yield-spread premiums).
15. See infra notes 23-145 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 146-184 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 97-110 and 201-204 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 133-145 and 201-217 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text
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mortgage brokers. 23 In a complex transaction, the borrower
usually deals with a mortgage broker, who in turn obtains the loan
from a lender. 24 The mortgage broker can be a valuable part of the
home-buying process by providing services and bringing the lender
and borrower together. 25 The common method of mortgage broker
26
compensation has sparked fierce litigation.
The broker can be compensated directly or indirectly. Direct
fees are those fees paid out-of-pocket by the borrower, such as a
processing fee or application fee, or fees that are added to the
principal amount of the loan. 27 Indirect compensation is fees paid
on the borrower's behalf to the broker based on the interest rate of
Yield-spread premiums are a form of indirect
the loan. 28
compensation and occur when the mortgage broker is paid a
29
portion of the borrower's interest rate on the loan.
30
Typically, a lender releases what is known as a rate sheet,

23. See, e.g., Neal Gendler, In the Courts: Mortgage brokers face challenge from
"yield-spread
premium' lawsuits, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb. 15, 1997, at D1.
See also Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (noting that "mortgage brokers occupy approximately fifty percent of the
market"); Simplifying and Improving the Process of Obtaining Mortgages To
Reduce Settlement Costs to Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134, 49,140 (July 29, 2002)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500) (noting that mortgage brokers "originate more
than sixty percent of the nation's mortgages") [hereinafter HUD Proposed Rule];
HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,080 (noting that mortgage brokers
originate more than half of new home mortgages).
24. A mortgage broker is most commonly used to refer to a person who is not
employed by a lender and "acts as an intermediary" in a mortgage loan. HUD
Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,134 n.2. A lender is the "real source of funds,"
while the mortgage broker simply facilitates the borrower's access to the funds
from the lender. Id.
25. Typical mortgage broker services include ordering credit reports and required
documents, filling out paperwork, and participating in loan closing. See HUD
Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,081. Additionally, mortgage brokers
counsel borrowers on loan products, collect application information, and gather
information to complete the mortgage loan. Id. They also provide office space and
facilities to carry out retail functions. Id. See also HUD Proposed Rule, supra note
23, at 49,140 (explaining that "[d]ifferences in credit ratings, employment status,
levels of debt, assets, and experience frequently translate into varying degrees of
effort required to originate a loan").
26. HUD estimates that over 150 lawsuits have been brought alleging the
illegality of indirect compensation to mortgage brokers under RESPA. HUD Policy
Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,083.
27. Id. at 10,081.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001)
(defining a "rate sheet' as an item distributed by the lender to the mortgage broker
each business day, listing the par rate and above-par rates). The sheet references a
formula that provides the broker with a yield-spread premium for the difference
between the par rate and above-par rate and the amount of the loan. Id. The work
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which delineates the par rate for loans offered through that
lender. 31 The broker's compensation is the excess of the par rate
and the "above par" loan given by the broker, commonly referred
to as the yield-spread premium. 32 This means that the borrower is
charged a higher interest rate than what the lender is offering,
and the excess is given as indirect compensation to the mortgage
33
broker.
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was
passed to cure abusive practices that resulted in "unnecessarily
high settlement charges," and to provide the consumer with more
timely and accurate information about the "nature and costs of the
Specifically, Congress noted that the
settlement process." 34
purpose of RESPA was to effect changes resulting in "more
effective advance disclosure" of settlement costs and to
eliminate "kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase
35
unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services."
HUD maintains that indirect fees, such as yield-spread
premiums, enable consumers who are unable to pay direct, or upfront, fees to obtain home loans. 36 This is partly correct: for those
consumers who do not have the money for up-front fees or whose
loan-to-value ratio disallows the option of financing the fee into
the principal of the loan, 37 indirect payment is an attractive option
for attaining homeownership. 38 Nevertheless, this argument

by the broker in originating the loan is not taken into account on the rate sheets.

Id.
31. A "par rate" is the interest rate at which there is no payment made to the
lender by the borrower and at which no payment from the borrower is made to the
lender. See, e.g., HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,134 n.3.
32. HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,081.
33. Id.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2002) (stating the congressional findings and purpose for
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act). 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b) expressly states
that the purpose of the legislation is to "effect certain changes in the settlement
process for residential real estate that will result ... (2) in the elimination of
kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase unnecessarily the costs of certain
settlement services." Id.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(2).
36. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,054.
37. See Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2002)
(discussing how lenders impose a loan-to-value ratio for each loan). A loan-to-value
ratio simply measures the amount of the principal with the value that it is
borrowed against; in the case of a mortgage, it would be the value of the home. Id.
Therefore, a borrower may not be able to add fees to the amount of the loan if the
principal amount significantly exceeds the value of the collateral. Id.
38. In fact, indirect fees by way of yield-spread premiums become the only viable
option to pay mortgage broker fees where the loan-to-value ration is exceeded and
the borrower is not able to pay up-front fees. Id.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 21:367

assumes that services are actually being provided in exchange for
the yield-spread premium. More often than not, a mortgage
broker is both paid directly and indirectly, with the yield-spread
premium going undisclosed to the borrower. 39 This merely
increases the cost of homeownership. 40 Where a yield-spread
premium is paid to the broker using only a rate sheet provided by
the lender, 41 it is highly unlikely that any services are provided in
exchange for that premium. 42 Since RESPA prohibits kickbacks
and unearned fees, 43 it would seem that yield-spread premiums
formulated from a mere rate-sheet violate RESPA. 44
B. Yield-Spread Premiums as a Form of PredatoryLending
"In conclusion, the $1620 yield spread premium on our loan
was nothing more than a bonus paid by the lender to the broker
for securing a bad deal for my husband and me, and referring a

45
better deal to the lender."

Predatory lending is a problem that is almost incapable of
39. See, e.g., Senate Banking Committee Hearingon PredatoryMortgage Lending
Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (statement of Ms.
Susan M. Johnson), at http:/Ibanking.senate.gov/02_Olhrg/010802/johnson.htm
[hereinafter Johnson] ("The $1620 yield spread premium was not disclosed,
discussed or agreed to before the closing ...[m]y husband and I were never
informed that our loan had an above-par interest rate because of the premium
payment from AMN AMRO [the lender] to the broker."). See Senate Banking
Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of
Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (statement of Ms. Rita Herrod), at
http://banking.senate.gov/02-Olhrg/010802/herrod.htm
[hereinafter
Herrod]
(explaining that Ms. Herrod had no idea that her interest rate could have been
8.85%, rather than almost ten percent, were it not for the mortgage broker's "secret
kickback of over $3300").
40. See supranote 39.
41. See, e.g., infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text (describing the Culpepper
cases).
42. This is because the rate paid to the mortgage broker is pre-determined by the
lender. See Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.
2001) (explaining that each business day, the lender "distributes a rate sheet to its
brokers"). Allowing the mortgage broker to essentially determine his or her own
fee cuts the borrower out of the fee-arrangement process, making it much more
likely that the fee is only tenuously related to the services rendered. After all, the
lender cannot police the services rendered by the broker. See generally HUD
Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,140-41 (noting that differently situated
borrowers require different levels of service, the fee should be determined by
reference to specific services rendered, not the ultimate amount of the loan).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2001).
44. Further, some scholars contend that yield-spread premiums are "against the
letter and spirit of federal laws designed to prohibit kickbacks and referral fees in
mortgage transactions." See Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting
Visible Results: When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 1057, 1078 (2001).
45. Johnson, supra note 39.
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definition. 46 While many agree that it is wrong, most cannot agree
on what it is. 47 At the lowest common denominator, it is a system48
of lending practices that prey on populations such as minorities.
Comparing the "borrower's cost" to the "creditor's take" is a useful
analytical tool to search out predatory lending. 49 Perhaps more
specifically, predatory lending can be classified into five general

schemes:
1) seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers,
2) harmful rent seeking,
3) fraud or deceptive practices,
4) lack of transparency that is not actionable as fraud, and
that borrowers waive meaningful legal
5) requirements
50
redress.

Mirroring the debate on predatory lending in general, yieldspread premiums are both touted as a way to increase
46. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259 n.4 (2002)
(discussing how the former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Phil
Gramm, lamented that the problem of predatory lending could not be addressed if
no one could decide what it is).
47. Id.
48. For a look at subprime lending and its disparate impact on minorities see
Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in Subprime Lending in America,
at
available
2000),
(April
overview
at
HUD,
The report finds that
www.hug.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressrel/subprime.html.
subprime loans are three times more likely in low-income neighborhoods than highincome neighborhoods, five times more likely in black neighborhoods than in white
neighborhoods, and, incredibly, twice as likely in high-income black neighborhoods
than in low-income white neighborhoods. Id. To see how subprime lending is
fertile ground for predatory lending, see Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage
Lending, HUD-Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, at 21-24, 69 (June
2000), available at www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (discussing and
defining the problem of predatory lending, within the context of subprime lending,
and its effect on minority, female, elderly, and low-income borrowers). For a look at
the specific practice of predatory home mortgage lending, see URBAN INSTITUTE,
supra note 8, at 11-13, which found that "minorities were less likely to receive
information about loan products, received less time and information from loan
officers, and were quoted higher interest rates in most of the cities where tests
were conducted." Importantly, "racial disparities in loan denial rates cannot be
'explained away' by differences in creditworthiness or by technical factors affecting
the analyses." Id. Finally, even pre-application inquiries by minority borrowers
were susceptible to discrimination. Id.
49. See Kathleen E. Keest, Whither Now? Truth in Lending In Transition Again, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 360, 363 (1995) (where one author likened
predatory lending to a "distorted price tag"). Keest gives the example of the grocery
shopper who buys a loaf of bread marked $1.80, but when brought up to the cashier
the price is subject to another forty cents in order to "pay the delivery man." Id.
Thus, the total cost is $2.20, not $1.80 as the price tag disclosed. Id. This is an
oversimplification of the problem of predatory lending, but couching the problem in
terms of the borrower's cost is a useful analytical tool. See id.
50. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1260.
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homeownership among the poor and decried as a deceptive
practice that harms the consumer. 5 1 Professor Howell E. Jackson
of Harvard Law School investigated the use of yield-spread
premiums and concluded that "[they] are rarely optional and
rarely needed."5 2 In particular, Professor Jackson found that
yield-spread premiums were just a tool to increase broker
compensation, while costing borrowers thousands of dollars,
especially African-American and Hispanic borrowers. 53 Finally,
yield-spread premiums arguably cause harmful rent-seeking by
mortgage brokers.5 4
Harmful rent-seeking occurs because
economic resources are diverted into loan products that could be
obtained at a lower cost.55 This "steering" is considered an
unsuitable method that increases predatory lending; 56 mortgage
brokers are able to "steer" borrowers into loans that are
57
disadvantageous due to the use of a yield-spread premium.
Perhaps most disturbing is that yield-spread premiums
create artificial market segmentation.58 This occurs when lenders,

51. See Lisa Morgan, Yield Spread Premiums for MortgageBrokers: Culpepper v.
Irwin Mortgage Corp. and the 2001 HUD Policy Statement, 6 N.C. BANKING INST.
571, 590-91 (Apr. 2002). Morgan notes that this debate is perhaps most clearly
delineated between mortgage brokers and consumer advocates. Id. At hearings
conducted by the Senate Banking Committee in January 2002, the president of the
National Association of Mortgage Brokers and the chairman-elect of the Mortgage
Bankers Associations both heralded the yield-spread premium as a tool advancing
home ownership. See id. See also Donaldson, supra note 8 (stating the yieldspread premiums disproportionately harm minority and female borrowers).
52. See Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending
Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002) (testimony of
at
Howell
E.
Jackson),
Prof.
http://banking.senate.gov/0201hrg/010802/jackson.htm [hereinafter Jackson].
53. See id.
54. "The practice of steering prime borrowers to high-cost lenders is an example
of pricing that is designed to extract harmful rents." See Engel & McCoy, supra
note 46, at 1266. Inaccurate price signals can encourage harmful rent-seeking that
results in a loss of economic resources. See generally id. at 1265-67. Economic
resources are poured into prices designed to extract harmful rents from consumers,
instead of prices that are competitive. Id. See also supra note 7 and accompanying
text (explaining that Ms.Hiers could have qualified for a lower interest-rate loan).
55. See discussion, supra notes 1-7 (explaining that Ms. Hiers actually qualified
for a lower-interest loan). The yield-spread premium attached to Beatrice Hiers'
loan serves as a prime example of harmful rent-seeking. Id. The entire amount of
her yield-spread premium could have been diverted to more efficient economic uses.
56. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1371-72 app.
57. Id.
58. See Havard, supra note 44, at 1075 ('Market segmentation is another term for
lenders' ability to select borrowers based on criteria other than credit factors.");
Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1271, 1281-83 (discussing market segmentation
as a tool of predatory lending).
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59
or brokers, identify distinct customer groups for certain products.
Thus, it is possible that a customer in one area is offered a credit
card at. a lower interest rate than another customer, merely
because of geographic groupings that the lender uses. 60 Often,
these geographic groupings are racially based.6 1 Incredibly, a
member of a minority group received "a credit card offer with
higher interest rates and lower credit limits than a white member
62
of [the] same interracial household."
Indeed, yield-spread premiums have a disproportionate
impact among African-Americans and Hispanics. 63 In Johnson v.
Equicredit Corporation of America,6 4 the plaintiff-borrower
claimed that Equicredit Corporation, a subsidiary of Bank of
America, was discriminating against minority borrowers by
utilizing yield-spread premiums. 65 Johnson claimed that similarly
situated Caucasian borrowers were given loans by Bank of
America, rather than its subsidiary Equicredit, and were not
charged a yield-spread premium, whereas minority borrowers
were serviced by Equicredit and forced to pay yield-spread
premiums. 66 This fact pattern illustrates Professor Jackson's
conclusion that minority groups are particularly affected by the

59. See Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing: Challenging Pre-Application
Lending Practices,87 GEO.L.J. 2181, 2190 (1999) (noting that financial institutions
divide their markets into groups according to geographic or demographic areas,
including religion, social class, age, and race); Havard, supra note 44, at 1070
("Lenders rely on economic and social codes that borrowers do not understand or
even realize fully.").
60. Lambert, supra note 59, at 2190 n.46 (Often, "middle-class neighborhoods
receive credit offers with low 'teaser' rates regardless of their credit history, while
residents in poor communities receive less attractive offers for collateralized credit,
irrespectiveof their credit history or income") (emphasis added).
61. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Obtains
Unprecedented Settlement from D.C. Area Bank for Allegedly Failing to Service
Predominantly
Black
Areas
(Aug.
22,
1994),
available
at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/August94/484.txt.html.
The Chevy Chase Federal
Savings Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, B.F. Saul Mortgage Company,
settled a suit brought by the Justice Department based on the refusal of those
companies to market services in minority neighborhoods. Id.
The market
segmentation went so far as to even exclude a county that had the "nation's lowest
disparity in income levels between black and white residents." Id. Virtually all
branches and mortgage offices were located in "majority white areas - delineated
by census tracts." Id.
62. Lambert, supra note 59, at 2190 n.49.
63. See Jackson, supra note 53, at 2 (explaining that the "less educated and the
less sophisticated about financial matters" fall prey to yield-spread premiums and
that the cost of mortgage broker services is much higher for African-American and
Hispanic borrowers than for other borrowers).
64. No. 01-C5197, 2002 WL 448991, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2002).
65. Id. at *5.
66. Id. at *6.
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cost of yield-spread premiums. 67
Professor Cassandra Jones Havard compares Ralph Ellison's
Invisible Man 68 to the plight of those who are preyed upon by subprime lenders. 69 Havard views such consumers as part of an
invisible market, where flawed market assumptions go
The
uncorrected, ultimately to the consumer's detriment.70
average borrower believes that a mortgage broker will search out
the best loan for him or her.7 1 Correcting the flawed assumptions
requires, in part, the limiting of loan fees such as yield-spread
2
premiums]
C. HUD's Interpretationof The Real Estate Settlement
ProceduresAct is Erroneous
1. HUD "Policy Statement I" Illogically Adopts the "Total
Compensation" Test
In response to abundant litigation regarding the legality of
yield-spread premiums, 7 3 HUD promulgated a policy statement
that sought to dispel confusion among the courts.74 However,
67. See Lambert, supra note 63, at 3-4.
68. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (Vintage International 1995) (1952).
69. See generally Havard, supra note 44. In Ellison's Invisible Man, the
protagonist, or the Invisible Man, though awarded a college scholarship, is
eventually expelled when he brings a white college trustee to the "wrong side of
town." Id. at 1063. The Invisible Man is eventually hired by the Brotherhood, "an
integrated organization that supposedly addresses issues of social equality." Id. at
1069. However, the Invisible Man learns that the true goal of Brotherhood is to
spark race riots. Id. at 1074. Ultimately, the Invisible Man's flawed assumptions
about the purposes of the organization cause him great harm because he recognizes
his lack of power in changing it. Id. Like the Invisible Man, many borrowers
misunderstand the broker's position and believe their broker is working as an
agent for them. See HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,141 ("[T]he fact is
that many brokers are perceived by borrowers as shopping on their behalf for the
best loan to meet the borrower's needs."). These flawed assumptions rarely get
corrected and the borrower suffers economic harm as a result. See id. (noting that
the false assumption deters the borrower from finding a loan on better terms).
70. Havard, supra note 44, at 1062. Like the Invisible Man, low-income and
minority borrowers are duped by lenders and brokers who do not fully disclose
information. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. A borrower, like
Beatrice Hiers, falls prey to invisible markets that serve to put her into unsuitable
and high-cost loans. See, e.g., supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
71. Havard, supra note 44, at 1077.
72. Id. at 1076-78.
73. See supra note 26 (noting HUD's estimate of over 150 lawsuits brought
alleging the illegality of yield-spread premiums).
74. HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,084. Courts took different
approaches to the legality of yield-spread premiums before HUD's first ruling in
March 1999. Id. Some courts required a case-by-case analysis, others certified a
class, and still others held that the analysis of yield-spread premiums must be
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HUD's Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Statement
of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage
Brokers 75 did little to dispel the controversy. 76 HUD Policy
Statement I clarified that yield-spread premiums are not illegal
per se, but required a two-part test to assess their legality." The
first step in the analysis requires an inquiry into whether goods or
facilities were furnished or services were performed for the
compensation paid. 78 The second step requires an inquiry into
whether the payments were reasonably related to value of goods or
services furnished or services performed. 79 This "reasonably
related" test calls for a look at "total compensation," which in turn
would be compared to prices in "similar transactions and in
similar markets" to assess its reasonableness. 8 0 The crux of the
inquiry is to determine if brokers are being compensated for mere
referrals of business or unearned fees, both of which are prohibited
by statute. 8 '
2. The Culpepper Cases Correctly Allow Class Certification
of the Legality of Yield-Spread Premiums
The Culpepper82 line of cases came in the aftermath of HUD's
subject to a rule of reason. Id. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text
(discussing the volume of litigation in this matter).
75. HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,084.
76. See HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,052 (noting that the rule
was being promulgated to dispel confusion since the issuance of HUD Policy
Statement I).
77. HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,084. It is also important to
note that the language in HUD Policy Statement I stated that "[tihe fees in cases or
classes of transactions are illegal if they violate the prohibitions of Section 8 of
RESPA." Id. (emphasis added). The "classes of transactions" language indicates
that perhaps class action litigation was not seen as prohibited in HUD Policy
Statement I, even though class action litigation was prohibited in a later policy
statement by the agency. See HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,054
(noting that the two-part test must be applied to the specific factual circumstances
of each transaction).
78. HUD Policy Statement I, supra note 10, at 10,084.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 10,085 (providing examples of broker services for which
compensation is justified).
82. The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama originally found that
the yield-spread premium was a payment for goods or services. Culpepper v.
Inland Mortgage Corp., 953 F. Supp. 367, 372 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (Culpepper1). The
Eleventh Circuit then reversed the grant of summary judgment and found that a
jury could find in the borrowers' favor. See Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.,
132 F.3d 692, 697-98 (11th Cir. 1998) (Culpepper II), reh'g denied, 144 F.3d 717,
718-19 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that the yield-spread premium was not
compensation for services). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit allowed class certification
of the issue. Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir.
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Policy Statement I. In December of 1995, the Culpeppers secured
a thirty-year home loan at 7.5%, 1.675% of which went to their
mortgage broker as a yield-spread premium.8 3 Premiere Mortgage
Company, the Culpeppers' mortgage broker, did not tell the
Culpeppers that they could have obtained a loan at a rate of
7.25%. 84 The yield-spread premium on the lower-interest loan
would have only been 0.125%, or $97.20. 85 The yield-spread
premium on the higher-interest rate garnered a 1.675% yieldspread premium, or $1,263.61, for Premier.8 6 This was paid in
addition to a 1% origination fee of $760.50 to Premium.8 7 Thus,
the Culpeppers ended up paying $2,024.11 to the mortgage broker,
rather than $857.70 that the lower interest rate would have
88
provided to the broker.
In the most current disposition of the case, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that under the test promulgated by HUD Policy
Statement I, a class can be certified to litigate the legality of yieldspread premiums.8 9 The court noted that where a yield-spread
premium was not negotiated loan-by-loan, 90 but rather was paid
only in accordance with "terms and conditions common to all the
loans," class certification was appropriate. 9 1 Importantly, the
court interpreted the test given by the HUD Policy Statement I as
92
not precluding class action.
The defendants in Culpepper III urged a reading of the first
prong of HUD's test that would make some referral fees legal so
long as they could be seen as reasonable service fees. 93 The court

2001) (CulpepperIlI).
83. Culpepper II, 132 F.3d at 694.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Culpepper 1, 953 F. Supp. at 370.
88. See Culpepper 11, 132 F.3d at 694. $857.70 is derived by adding the
origination fee to the yield-spread premium of $97.20 on the lower-interest loan the
Culpeppers could have received. Id.
89. Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1332 (lth Cir. 2001)
(Culpepper III) ("Given the test for liability that we interpret the HUD Statement
and Culpepper I to impose, in these circumstances the district court acted within its
discretion in determining that common questions of law and fact predominate and
that class certification is thus appropriate.").
90. Id. at 1332. The lender gave Premiere a rate sheet that only allows for
calculation of how many loans are given above, below, or at par. Id. at 1326. This
'rate sheet" method does not take into account any work done by the broker for the
borrower. Id.
91. Id. at 1332.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1330.
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instead adopted the plaintiffs interpretation: HUD's first inquiry
into goods or services for compensation paid required an inquiry
into whether the yield-spread premium was paid in exchange for
those goods or services. 94 In short, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the yield-spread premium must be in exchange for those services
and not merely for a referral. 95 Thus, the Culpepper III court did
not even reach the second "reasonableness" prong of the analysis
under HUD Policy Statement 1.96
3. HUD Policy Statement II Erroneously Disallows Class
Action Litigation Surrounding the Legality of YieldSpread Premiums
Under a new executive administration, and in response to the
Culpepper III interpretation of the HUD test and concomitant
grant of class certification, HUD promulgated another policy
statement in October, 2001.97 HUD Policy Statement II clarified
that the first inquiry into the performance of compensable goods
and services, and the legality of yield-spread premiums in
particular, is not amenable to a mere inquiry into the existence of
a rate sheet. 98 In addition, HUD noted that each transaction must
99
be looked at individually.
The second prong of the HUD inquiry, reasonableness of the
broker fees, requires an examination to ascertain if the mortgage
broker's total compensation is reasonably related to the "total set
of goods or facilities actually furnished or services performed."'10 0
Although HUD noted that delivery of a higher interest rate loan is
not a compensable service, 10 1 HUD Policy Statement II effectively
precludes class action and narrowly limits the illegality of yield-

94. Id. at 1331.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,052-54.
98. Id. at 53,055 ("Whether or not a yield spread premium is legal or illegal
cannot be determined by the use of a rate sheet, but by how HUD's test applies to
the transaction involved."). The Eleventh Circuit in Culpepper III used the rate
sheet to show presumptive illegality when the broker merely referenced the sheet
rather than each borrower's specific situation or the services necessary to service
the borrower. See supranotes 90-91 and accompanying text.
99. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,054. This individual look
includes "examining all of the goods or facilities provided or services performed by
the broker in the transaction, whether the goods, facilities or services are paid for
by the borrower, the lender, or partly by both." Id. at 53,055.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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spread premiums. 102 As a result, subsequent court decisions have
10 3
relied on Policy Statement II to deny class certification.
Functionally, it is difficult for an individual plaintiff to have a
claim, since only excessive total compensation can be found to be
10 4
unearned fees or kickbacks.
D. Later Courts Have Been Criticalof HUD Policy
Statement II
Following HUD Policy Statement II, most courts have
refused to certify class litigation surrounding the legality of yieldspread premiums. 105 Some judges have, however, criticized the
reasoning behind HUD's articulation of the rule surrounding yieldspread premiums. 10 6 Beginning with Culpepper III, which allowed
class certification to determine the legality of yield-spread
premiums, 0 7v courts have criticized the post-hoc rationalization of

102. See id. (requiring scrutiny of individual transactions only and, even then,
merely requiring "reasonableness" in the total compensation where services
HUD Policy
provided were neither non-existent, nominal, nor duplicative).
Statement II specifically states that a yield-spread premium cannot be presumed to
be a referral fee. Id.
103. See, e.g., Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 966 (8th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a class certification because the HUD Policy Statement indicates that
loan-specific analysis is required); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d
1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (deferring to HUD Policy Statement II in not granting
class certification because individual issues predominated).
104. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,053 (explaining that total
compensation must not be in excess of the reasonable value of goods or services
provided). See also Donaldson, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing that "it is impossible to
assess the reasonableness of one borrower's payments in a vacuum").
105. E.g., Schuetz, 292 F.3d at 1014; Glover, 283 F.3d at 966; Costa v. SIB
Mortgage Corp., 210 F.R.D. 84, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cedeno v. Fieldstone Mortgage
Co., No. 01-C5110, 2002 WL 1592759, at *5 (N.D. 111. July 19, 2002); Vargas v.
Universal Mortgage Corp., No. 01-C0087, 2001 WL 1545874, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
29, 2001).
106. Schuetz, 292 F.3d at 1014-17 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (finding that HUD's
Policy Statements are incorrect as to yield-spread premiums and should not be
given deference); Costa, 210 F.R.D. at 88 (noting that the test "suffers from various
shortcomings," including the opportunity for "easy post-hoc rationalization")
(citations omitted); Dominguez v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 907, 91314 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (criticizing the test's omission of a look at congressional intent
and its tolerance for "post hoc explanation of fees"); Vargas, 2001 WL 1545874, at
*3 (criticizing the test's allowance of post-hoc rationalization of a fee "so long as it is
not wildly excessive or explicitly termed a 'referral fee'); Bjustrom v. Trust One
Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (expressing skepticism for
the test's ability to adequately protect consumers and noting that a test "where
HUD looks to see if consumers are actually receiving something for potentially
higher interest rates would be more effective" (emphasis in original)).
107. Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Culpepper Ill).
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fees that the HUD "total compensation" test allows. 08 By only
inquiring into the reasonableness of total compensation, courts
have recognized that this allows a mortgage broker to charge a
yield-spread premium that may really be a prohibited referral
fee. 10 9 Finally, HUD rulemakings requiring individual litigation of
claims with little monetary value create a disincentive to plaintiffs
because of the cost of litigation.' 10
E. HUD's New Proposed Disclosures Will Curb Litigation,
but Still Will Allow Reliance on the Erroneous "Total
Compensation" Test
Most recently, HUD has proposed a rule that affords new
disclosure and transparency for the yield-spread premium."' The
rule does not repeal the "total compensation" test, but rather
1 2
proposes the transparent disclosure of a yield-spread premium.
In some instances, RESPA's prohibition on unearned fees will not
113
even be applied.
HUD's proposed rule closed for comment on October 28,
2002.114 If promulgated in its present form, it will require yieldspread premiums to be disclosed as a lender payment to the
borrower on the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) form 1 5 and the HUD
Presently, the yield-spread
1/1A Settlement Statement." 6
117
premium is not required to be disclosed on the GFE form.
Instead, it is only disclosed at settlement on the Settlement
Statement. 118 This new type of disclosure will benefit the borrower
because the GFE form is required to be sent to the borrower before
settlement. 119 Thus, HUD anticipates that the borrower's new
108. See supra note 106.
109. See supra note 106.
110. Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (W.D. Wash.
2001). See also infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
111. HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,146-49.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 49,152-55 (detailing an instance of "safe harbor" for packagers of
mortgage broker services). See also infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text
(describing HUD's "safe harbor" provisions).
114. HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,134.
115. Id. at 49,136. The GFE is a form given to the borrower to estimate the total
cost of the loan to the borrower. Id. at 49,148.
116. Id. at 49,147. Previously, the yield-spread premium was reported as "Paid
Outside of Closing" in a column that is attributed as lender payments to the broker.
Id. Therefore, the yield-spread premium is not reported as a fee in the borrower
column under current regulations. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 49,148. The current requirements for a Good Faith Estimate do not
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knowledge gained at an earlier date will promote shopping and
120
increase competition in the mortgage broker industry.
In addition, HUD's proposed rule would allow for a new type
of "packaging" in the home mortgage system. 121 Any loan
originator who provides a guaranteed interest rate and fees to the
borrower for a period of thirty days would be exempt from
RESPA's prohibition on unearned fees. 122 Specifically, this "safe
harbor" would only apply to persons inside the package, such as
123
lenders, brokers, and other settlement service providers.
Unearned fees between people inside the package and people
outside the package would still be policed by HUD.124 In addition,
if a packager violates the borrower's guarantee, the "safe harbor"
125
would be inapplicable.
HUD believes the new disclosure requirements and
packaging option will inject competition and increase borrower
In
shopping opportunities for mortgage broker services. 26
addition, HUD believes that the proposed rule will decrease
litigation surrounding yield-spread premiums and reduce
instances of predatory lending. 27 However, HUD's promulgation
of Policy Statement II perhaps sounded the death knell for
litigation surrounding the legality of yield-spread premiums,
especially class litigation.128
include information on all costs to the borrower. Id. In addition, a borrower has
often already paid significant fees in order to receive a Good Faith Estimate. Id.
The new GFE regulations require more complete disclosure of fees, as well as only
requiring basic information from the borrower so as to limit the spenditure of fees
before issuance of the GFE. Id. at 49,149.
120. Id. at 49,149.
121. Id. at 49,152. This package can be provided to the consumer in lieu of the
GFE. Id. at 49,154.
122. Id. at 49,153. In particular, the package must be offered within three days
of the borrower's application and must include, without any fee, the following:
(1) a guaranteed price for the loan origination and virtually all other
lender required settlement services ... (2) a mortgage loan with an interest
rate guarantee ... and (3) a Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement
(GMPA) ... [that] would remain open as an offer for a minimum of 30 days
from when the document is delivered or mailed to the borrower.
Id.
123. Id. at 49,152. HUD reasons that without the "safe harbor," persons inside
the package offering services will be unable to retain profits for fear of violating the
prohibition against unearned fees. Id. at 49,154. HUD has determined that the
benefit to borrowers through a new "packaging" scheme outweigh the benefits of
prohibiting unearned fees in this particular instance. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 49,134.
127. Id. at 49,147.
128. The Chairman of the Mortgage Banker's Association, Mr. Courson, stated:
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If any hope of challenging yield-spread premiums was alive
after the "total compensation" test, HUD's proposed rule
effectively quashes it because the broker will not be subjected to
scrutiny if within the safe harbor. 129 Since the broker is exempted
from compliance with RESPA's prohibition on unearned fees if the
broker comes within the safe harbor, the borrower has no claim
when charged a yield-spread premium in exchange for no services
rendered.130
Moreover, the borrower must go from moxtgage
broker to mortgage broker in order to search out the lowest yieldspread premium to be charged. Most importantly, HUD's former
attempts at disclosures have not caused increased shopping by
consumers.131
HUD's proposed rule shifts the emphasis from
unearned fees to lowest cost. 132 However, one must ask whether
this new emphasis merely begs the question: That is, are yieldspread premiums being used unnecessarily as a tool to increase
mortgage broker compensation? The new disclosure requirements
do not solve this dilemma and do not create a mortgage broker
who will work for the borrower.

F. A Suitability Requirement Forces Someone to Work for
the Borrower
In agency law, the agent owes fiduciary duties to the
principal. 133 Specifically, the agent must deal fairly with the
134
principal and act for the benefit of the principal in all matters.
"What we were able to do, with HUD, through this YSP clarification, is to get those
lawsuits stopped. That's a very big deal." Tommy Fernandez, Is MBA Finally
Ready to Silence Naysayers?, 167 AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 2002, availableat 2002 WL
26547662.
129. HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,152.
130. Id. at 49,154 (explaining that only entities outside the package will be
subject to Section 8 [RESPA scrutiny barring unearned fees and referral fees], thus
exempting from scrutiny those entities inside the package).
131. Id. at 49,147 (noting HUD's Special Information Booklet given to consumers
to explain the homebuying process to them). Note that the Settlement Cost Booklet
must be revised because it incorrectly suggests that yield-spread premiums are not
costs to borrowers. Id. at 49,147 n.37.
132. Id. at 49,145 (maintaining that "costs [to the borrower) would be lowered").
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958). "Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a "principal") manifests assent to another
person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958). Note that the
lawyer-client relationship is one of agency. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.3, 1.4, 1.6 - .10 (detailing duties of diligence, communication, and
confidentiality owed to the client by the lawyer, as well as prohibiting conflicts of
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HUD's proposed rule eliminates the possibility of creating an
135
agency relationship between a mortgage broker and a borrower.
136
Instead, a suitability requirement
for mortgage brokers and the
formation of a self-regulatory organization 137 would best serve the
138
needs of the borrower.
Analogously, the securities industry has determined that
mandatory disclosures do not provide enough protection for
individual investors. 139 A suitability requirement is also imposed
to protect the investor. 140 For instance, most investors do not
understand the sophisticated information that is contained on
14
certain SEC disclosure documents such as the prospectus. '
Therefore, the complexity of information necessary to make an
informed decision is taken into account when imposing a
suitability requirement.142
The complexity of necessary
information serves to create a relationship of trust with the
service-provider. 1 43 Additionally, the party in the best position to
interest between lawyer and client). Therefore, a lawyer working for a corporate
client must disclose to an employee of the client-corporation that the lawyer does
not represent the employee should the employee's interests clash with those of the
employer. See id. R. 1.13(d).
135. See HUD Proposed Rule, supra note 23, at 49,147. The proposed rule would
require that the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) describe the services of the broker
including a disclaimer that the broker does not "shop for ... the lowest price or best
terms available in the market." Id. at 49,146-47. The GFE will inform the
borrower that he or she should shop around for the best offer. Id. The "language
seeks to disabuse borrowers of the notion that brokers or other loan originators are
their agents, and therefore are automatically shopping for them, a notion that can
prevent their own shopping." Id.
136. "Suitability" would require that the broker is aware of an individual client's
financial situation and risk assessment. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1318.
More importantly, it puts the onus on the broker to prove an "adequate and
reasonable basis" for any recommendation. Id. at 1324.
137. Self-regulatory organizations, such as the stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers, register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Id. at 1321. The organizations adopt rules that are enforced by
the SEC. Id. at 1321-22. Internal controls by the organizations ensure compliance
to avoid SEC prosecution. Id. at 1328-29. These internal controls serve, in part, as
best practices that protect the interests of the investor.
138. Id. at 1336 ("Disclosure has proven useless, and financial literacy is
hopelessly costly and unlikely to succeed."). See HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON
PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 117 (June
2000), available at www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (discussing the
need to track mortgage brokers at the federal level for high loan default and claim
rates).
139. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1334-35.

140. Id. See also Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards:A New Look at Economic
Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805, 830-31 (Apr. 1985).
141. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1335.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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avoid harm at the lowest cost "should bear the cost of avoiding the
harm. 144 Certainly Ms. Hiers should not have to bear the cost of
avoiding harm when her mortgage broker is in a unique position of
trust and expertise in relation to her. 145 Examining the research,
it becomes clear that HUD has inadequately addressed the state of
yield-spread premiums thus far.
II. ANALYSIS
A. HUD's Total Compensation Test is Unfaithful to the Text
of RESPA
RESPA prohibits any kickback or referral fee. 146 HUD's test
for determining if yield-spread premiums are illegal, as
promulgated by Policy Statement II, is not faithful to the text of
the RESPA; merely outlawing yield-spread premiums if the total
compensation is unreasonable will still allow kickbacks. 147 For
example, Beatrice Hiers's mortgage broker would still receive over
$10,000 in compensation, even though Ms. Hiers had no idea she
By only
could have qualified for a loan on better terms. 148
requiring an analysis of "total compensation," HUD's test implicity
allows kickbacks because it does not require the matching of fees
Since kickbacks are expressly
with services rendered. 149
prohibited under RESPA, kickbacks should be per se illegal,
regardless of the excessiveness or reasonableness of the total
compensation package. If Congress wanted to permit referral fees

144. Id. at 1335.
145. See Hiers, supra note 6 ("Because I was inexperienced with real estate
Because
transactions, I engaged the services of Homebuyers Mortgage Company ...
of my experiences with mortgage brokers and Yield Spread Premiums, I will never
go to a mortgage broker again.").
146. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2001) ("No person shall give and no person shall accept
any ... kickback.").

147. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (citing several courts criticizing
HUD's test because it allows for post-hoc rationalization for fees that are not wildly
excessive but nonetheless still unearned).
148. See Donaldson,supra note 8 (noting that the payment of over $10,000 to Ms.
Hiers's broker would be defined as "reasonable"). See also Hiers, supra note 6
(stating she could have received a better loan and never knew about the yieldspread premium she was being charged).
149. See Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1014-17 (9th Cir.
2002) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld noted that Congress did not
permit kickbacks if they seem to work out economically for increased
homeownership, but rather all kickbacks are prohibited. Id. at 1015. Since the
relationship between yield-spread premiums and mortgage broker compensation
was too "fortuitous," Kleinfeld would find the yield-spread premium not "within
RESPA's explicit exceptions" to prohibited referral fees. Id. at 1016.
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conditioned on the entire compensation scheme being subject to a
reasonableness requirement, then Congress would not have
expressly prohibited any fee or kickback not in exchange for goods
actually furnished or services actually performed. 150
In addition, a common-sense reading of RESPA's exceptions
to the prohibition against kickback and unearned fees also cuts
against HUD's "total compensation" test. 151 RESPA excepts
prohibition of the payment of a fee for "facilities actually furnished
or for services actually performed."'152 The plain meaning of this
exception would seem to limit the exception to instances where a
Yet, if a "total
broker is paid for facilities or services.
compensation" test is utilized, the exception becomes conflated to
include fees that are reasonable, regardless of whether or not the
fees were paid for "facilities actually furnished or for services
153
actually performed."'
For example, in Dominguez v. Alliance Mortgage Company 154 ,
the plaintiff-borrower paid up-front fees of $1,878.93, but the
defendant-mortgage broker also received indirect compensation
from a yield-spread premium in the amount of $1,901.40.155 The
mortgage broker was not required to show services and goods
furnished for the yield-spread premium. 56 Instead, the court
found the total compensation to be reasonable and thus found the
yield-spread premium not prohibited by RESPA. 157 The court
never determined what was provided to the plaintiff-borrower in
exchange for the yield-spread premium, because the court
assumed the legality of the yield-spread premium once total
compensation was deemed to be reasonable and not excessive. 58 A
faithful reading of RESPA's prohibition against kickbacks and
unearned fees would recognize that all unearned fees should be
prohibited, not only those that are excessive.
B. Yield-Spread Premiums Should Be Illegal If Paid
Without Exchange of Services or Goods
Policy Statement II misstates the core concern.

HUD's

150. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
151. Id. The statute uses the word "any," which implies a total prohibition on
kickbacks, not a prohibition on excessive kickbacks. See id.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. § 2607(c).
Id.
226 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. I1. 2002).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
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rulings do not solve the problem of unearned fees or kickbacks that
are prohibited by RESPA.5 9 A yield-spread premium, no matter
what amount, is excessive if not in exchange for goods or services
received. 160 HUD's "total compensation" test does not effectively
search out illegal yield-spread premiums. By only recognizing the
illegality of yield-spread premiums when total compensation is
excessive, 161 HUD implicitly allows yield-spread premiums to be
paid by borrowers where no goods or services are received in
62
exchange, thereby violating RESPA's prohibition on kickbacks.
For example, a borrower who pays an origination fee of one
percent of principal and also pays other fees and costs up-front to
the broker, will not be protected from paying a yield-spread
This is exactly the situation in most cases
premium. 163
64
challenging the legality of yield-spread premiums. 1
The true inquiry should be whether goods or services are
performed in exchange for the yield-spread premium, not whether
the total compensation is reasonable. 16 5 Indeed, HUD's look at
similar transactions in similar markets as a gauge for
reasonableness merely states the problem. 66 Market comparison
will yield skewed results because all brokers may be using yieldspread premiums. 167 Further, broker-only comparisons do little to

159. See supra note 12. Neither RESPA's prohibition on kickbacks and unearned
fees nor the exception for payment for goods or services mentions anything about
reasonableness or excessiveness. Id.
160. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,055.
161. See id.
162. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2002) (prohibiting kickbacks and unearned fees).
163. See, e.g., Costa v. SIB Mortgage Corp., 210 F.R.D. 84, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Dominguez, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 907; Cedeno v. Fieldstone Mortgage Co., No. 01 C
5110, 2002 WL 1592759, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Krzalic v. Am. Home Mortgage
Corp., No. 01 C 9107, 2002 WL 924618, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Bjustrom v. Trust
One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2001). Each case
illustrates an instance where a plaintiff-borrower already paid significant closing
costs and was still charged a yield-spread premium.
164. See supra note 163. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text (citing
courts who, relying on HUD Policy Statement II, have refused to certify class action
litigation).
165. See Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324, 1329-31 (11th Cir.
2001) (Culpepper III) (explaining that a true test for yield-spread premiums'
legality would require compensation paid in the form of a yield-spread premium to
be in exchange for goods or services).
166. See HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,054 (noting that "total
compensation should be carefully considered in relation to price structures and
practices in similar transactions and in similar markets").
167. See Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting
plaintiff-borrower's argument that HUD's reasonability valuation is self-serving
because it creates "a system that drowns any reasonability standard in a sea of
The court rejected this argument by plaintiff,
broker-only comparisons").
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stave the problem of yield-spread premiums being paid by
borrowers without any delivery of goods or performance of services
in exchange. Since reasonableness is tied to other mortgagebrokers, it is hard to argue that kickbacks are actually being
policed by a market comparison to search out excessiveness. In
any event, kickbacks are illegal regardless of how the rate fares in
16s
comparison to the market.
In addition, the court would not have to "price" regulate
under an alternative system of matching services and goods with
payment of yield-spread premiums. 169 The courts would merely be
required to target the goods or services provided in exchange for
the yield-spread premium. This would require no regulation of the
market. In fact, the "total compensation" test requires an analysis
of the market for reasonableness, 170 while the matching test would
require only a pairing of goods or services and compensation paid
in exchange.
1. Class Action Litigation Regarding the Legality of YieldSpread Premiums Should Not Be Barred
A permissible construction of RESPA does not preclude class
action litigation surrounding kickbacks. HUD Policy Statement
II's preclusion of class action litigation regarding the legality of
yield-spread premiums is erroneous.1 71 Indeed, the court in
Culpepper III was correct in granting a motion of class
certification. 7 2 In holding that a jury could find that the yieldspread premiums at issue were illegal referral fees, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized that "the standardized terms under which [the
plaintiff] pays yield-spread premiums can by themselves prove
that yield-spread premiums are fees for referrals."'173 By first
countering that courts are able to gauge reasonableness. Id.
168. See supra note 12 (quoting RESPA's language that prohibits unearned fees
and kickbacks without reference to market comparisons).
169. Price regulation connotes the court's scrutiny of mortgage broker fees as
"reasonable." Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1343 ("Without more, a broad
reasonableness standard ... would pose the danger of deteriorating into general
price regulation."). A system of matching services with price would generally not
require a look at the "reasonableness" of the compensation. See id.
170. See supra note 166.
171. See Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Co., 253 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Culpepper II1)(finding that common questions of law and fact can predominate
when the terms and conditions for payment of a yield spread premium are the same
for all borrowers because the payment was based on a "rate sheet").
172. Id. at 1332 (granting class certification where the terms and conditions of
payments of yield-spread premiums were determined by a rate sheet for all
borrowers, without individual analysis of their financial situation).
173. Id.
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inquiring whether any services or goods were provided in exchange
for the yield-spread premium itself, the court correctly observed
that there was no need for a loan-by-loan look at each borrower's
This method of inquiry more closely
specific transaction.174
parallels the structure of the loan when a rate-sheet is utilized.
Reasoning that the system in place from broker to lender was a
simple rate-sheet and that there was no individual analysis by the
broker into the specifics of the borrower's financials, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the mortgage broker was really being
compensated for referrals. 75 The court allowed class certification
of the legality of the yield-spread premiums because all members
76
of the class had similar issues of law and fact.'
This decision was correct because Congress did not eliminate
a class action as a remedy in the RESPA statute. 77 RESPA's
allowance of attorney's fees and treble damages in individual cases
merely demonstrates the seriousness of a violation.1 78 The statute
does not in any way negate the existence of class action as a viable
method of challenging the legality of yield-spread premiums as
prohibited kickbacks. Indeed, judicial economy calls for class
litigation as a potential litigation tool in these cases.' 7 9 As HUD
itself has stated, hundreds of cases have been filed alleging
80
violations of RESPA by the use of yield-spread premiums.
Where rate-sheets are used, as in the Culpepper cases, common
issues of law and fact predominate and as such, class certification
8
is appropriate.' '

174. Id.
175. Id. at 1331-32.
176. Id. at 1332.
177. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d) (2001) (stating penalties for violation but not prohibiting
class action).
178. Id.
179. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2002) (allowing for class action where common
questions of law and fact predominate and noting that class action is "superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
180. See supra note 26 (noting HUD's estimate of over 150 lawsuits brought).
181. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing class action as
appropriate where a rate sheet, which does not reference the specific situation of
the borrower, is used to determine mortgage broker fees). According to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the four requirements for class action include: (1) a class
so numerous that joinder is impracticable; (2) common questions of law and fact; (3)
"claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class"; and (4) the interests of the class are fairly and adequately
protected by the representative parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). The Culpepper
III court recognized that all of these elements were met in a situation where all
borrowers had used the same mortgage broker and lender, and each borrower was
charged a yield-spread premium based on a rate sheet. Culpepper III, 253 F.3d at
1332. Further, the court noted that the defendant-lender offered no proof of
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2. Yield-Spread Premiums From the Use of Rate Sheets
Should Be Presumptively Illegal
RESPA's prohibition of unearned fees should extend to a
prohibition on interest rates that are configured only by means of
a rate-sheet.8 2 Where a mortgage broker does not delve into the
borrower's individual situation, but instead relies on the use of a
rate sheet provided by the lender to determine the interest rate,
the transaction has the appearance of an illegal kickback. 183 The
appearance of a kickback should become a presumption in favor of
the borrower during the course of litigation.
A mortgage broker's work is lessened when, armed with a
rate sheet, the broker simply mechanically lumps a borrower into
a loan category. This sort of mechanical categorization does not
call for any discretion on the broker's part. Thus, there is a lesser
amount of service being provided to the borrower. HUD does the
borrower a disservice by maintaining that the rote procedure
afforded by use of a rate-sheet should not be analyzed when
searching out unearned kickbacks. 184 To the contrary, the use of a
rate-sheet will go far in bringing a mortgage broker's true
discretion to light.
If shown that borrowers were systematically given the same
rates and that these rates were determined by rate-sheets, the
burden should shift to the defendant-broker to prove the
nonexistence of unearned kickbacks. In essence, the defendantbroker should be required to show that services were rendered and
that the borrower's loan terms were not determined by mechanical
use of a rate-sheet. The alternative is a system where a borrower
visits a mortgage broker, only to be charged more for a less
advantageous loan. One can see the tragic comedy of a broker who
does nothing more than provide the borrower with forms that are
not understood and a higher interest rate for the borrower's
trouble.

individual work done for each borrower. Id.
182. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Culpepper line
of cases); see also infra Part L.A (explaining that a rate sheet is a compilation of
interest rates charged by the lender, including the par rate, or rate at which the
mortgage broker receives no compensation).
183. See supra,note 182.
184. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,055.
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C. HUD's Test for Yield-Spread Premiums Will Have a
DisparateImpact on Minority Borrowers and Will Not
Increase Home Ownership

18 5
Yield-spread premiums adversely affect minority groups.
Given that yield-spread premiums are a method of lowering upfront costs during the home-buying process, 86 because the
borrower's financial situation prohibits direct fees, 8 7 it is easy to
see how the poor would be disparately impacted. Direct fees are
not possible where the borrower cannot afford such payments, or
where the loan-to-value ratio prohibits the roll-up of fees into the
principal of the loan.' 8 8 Professor Howell E. Jackson concluded
that his "best estimate is that borrowers, on average, enjoy 25
[O]n
cents of benefit for each dollar of yield spread premiums ....
the order of seventy five percent . . . serve only to increase the
18 9
compensation of mortgage brokers."'
In addition, Professor Jackson found that the "average
additional charge" for African-Americans is $474 per loan and
$580 per loan for Hispanics. 190 Overall, his study "suggests that
industry practices allow for certain racial groups to be charged on
the order of $500 to $600 more per transaction in mortgage broker
compensation."' 9' Bolstering this hypothesis, an Urban Institute
Study found that minorities are less likely than other borrowers to
receive all the information about a loan product and are often

185. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Johnson case
where similarly situated Caucasian borrowers were given more advantageous
loans, without yield-spread premiums, while non-white borrowers were weigheddown with yield-spread premiums and served by a different subsidiary of the
company). See also discussion supra Part .B (discussing yield-spread premiums as
a form of predatory lending). See generally G. Carol Brani, Civil Rights and
Mortgage Lending Discrimination:Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under The
DisparateTreatment Theory, 5 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 42, 44-45 (1999); Richard
D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effect of Expanded Disclosure
Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing, Lending and Discriminationin the New York
Metropolitan Area, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481, 528-29 (1999).
186. HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,054 (indicating "that up front
costs could be lowered by yield-spread premiums").
187. Id. (indicating that yield-spread premiums can be used by "those without the
available cash").
188. Id. ("For those without the available cash, who are at the maximum loan-toThis third option is a yield spread
value ratio ... there is a third option.
premium.").
189. Jackson, supra note 53.
190. Id.
191. Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case
of Yield Spread Premiums 128 (Jan. 28 2002) (unpublished draft), available at
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/pdfs/january-draft.pdf.
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192
quoted higher interest rates.

D. The New Transparency in the ProposedRule Will Still
Not Search Out Illegal Referral Fees
1. The Proposed Rule Implicitly Legalizes Yield-Spread
Premiums
HUD's new proposed rule goes even further in presumptively
legalizing yield-spread premiums. While increasing disclosure, the
proposed rule also legalizes unearned fees and kickbacks for those
who fall within its safe-harbor exceptions. 193 Transparency is a
step in the right direction, 194 but allowing unearned fees in specific
instances 195 will not lower the cost of home ownership. Indeed, the
proposed rule only ensures that the borrower learns of the yieldspread premium, not that the yield-spread premium is earned or
even that the broker attempt to get the best loan for the
96
borrower.1
2. Implicitly Legalizing Yield-Spread Premiums Will Not
Curb Abusive Practices
The proposed rule will still lead to the same situation as seen
in Culpepper, where the plaintiffs were not aware that they even
qualified for a lower interest rate. 197 As such, relying on a rate
sheet to determine yield-spread premiums is an abusive practice
that is not curbed by HUD's newest proposed rule. A suitability
requirement would adequately protect borrowers in the situation
of the Culpeppers, 198 as would promulgation of a rule that tied
192. HUD News Release, No. 99-191, New Reports Document Discrimination

Against Minorities by Mortgage Lending Institutions (Sept. 15, 1999), available at
www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressrel/pr99-191.html ('The testing found that
overall, minorities were less likely to receive information about loan products,
received less time and information from loan officers, and were quoted higher
interest rates in most of the cities where tests were conducted.").
193. See discussion supra Part I.E (describing the "safe harbor" provided to
mortgage brokers and lenders who offer lending "packages" to borrowers).
194. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosures
in HUD Proposed Rule).
195. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (detailing the "safe harbor" in
HUD Proposed Rule that would allow exemption from Section 8 [RESPA's
prohibition on unearned fees and referral fees] scrutiny).
196. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting HUD Proposed Rule
would disavow any notion that the broker is the borrower's agent).
197. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (explaining that the Culpeppers paid a yieldspread premium based on a rate sheet and not an individual look at their financial
situation).
198. See supra notes 82-96 (discussing the factual situation of the Culpeppers).
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yield-spread premiums to specific services. 199 Because brokers will
not be "lobbying" for the borrower, but rather for their fees,
borrowers will effectively be unaided from paying unearned fees
and higher interest rates. This is especially the case where
brokers and lenders are given "safe harbor" from the RESPA
200
prohibitions on kickbacks and unearned fees.
E. A SuitabilityRequirement Will Curb The Use Of Illegal
Referral Fees And Aid Minority, Female, and
UnsophisticatedBorrowers
Since class-action litigation is effectively barred by HUD
Policy Statement 11,201 plaintiff-borrowers must rely on individual
plaintiffs' attorneys to take on a case. Proponents of the bar on
class certification note that RESPA's allowance for attorney's fees
and costs will ensure that borrowers' interests are appropriately
represented in the legal sphere. 202 However, litigation of an
individual claim worth only a few thousand dollars is unlikely to
appeal to any plaintiffs' attorney. 20 3 In addition, HUD's proposed
20 4
rule and its disclosures will not aid the borrower.
In conjunction with professional rules and standards, a
suitability requirement should be imposed upon the mortgage
broker. Like the securities industry, the home buying process is
replete with complex forms and information not easily
comprehended by the average homebuyer. 205
This complex
information often makes the borrower rely on the mortgage broker
20 6
as "de-coder."

199. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that the Culpepper III
court required tying the fees to the services).
200. See discussion supra Part I.E (discussing the new "safe harbor" provisions of
HUD Proposed Rule).
201. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that HUD Policy
Statement II requires each transaction to be looked at individually). See also
discussion supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the erroneous barring of class action by
HUD Policy Statement II).
202. See, e.g., Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 966 (8th Cir. 2002)
(using the statute's provision of attorneys fees and costs as a reason to reverse a
grant of class certification by the district court).
203. See Bjustrom v. Trust One Mortgage, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (noting the effective closing off of class action litigation and even
litigation by individuals due to HUD Policy Statement II).
204. See discussion supra Part II.D (explaining that the HUD Proposed Rule will
not effectively aid the borrower).
205. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text (noting that forms include
GFE and HUD-1 statements).
206. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting that the HUD Proposed
Rule admits that borrowers generally think brokers are their agents).
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A suitability requirement and the promulgation of selfregulating organizations for licensed mortgage brokers would
protect the borrower and place the cost of avoiding harm on those
in he best position to avoid the hard at the lowest cost. Because
disclosure will not adequately protect the borrower in a complex
industry, 20 7 a system with standards for suitability, best
practices, 2 8 licensing requirements, and penalties is the best
method for protecting the borrower and curbing unearned
kickbacks. All of these changes would go far in ensuring mortgage
broker compliance. 209 Much like the securities industry, mortgage
brokers should be required to register with a national organization
that would police the enforcement of suitability requirements and
standards of conduct.2 10 Because mortgage brokers possess the
necessary information regarding home loans, they are in the best
position to avoid the harm caused by asymmetrical information
and harmful rent-seeking. 211 In conjunction with a cause of action
for a breach of a duty of suitability, the self-regulation of brokers
would go far in ensuring that borrowers are adequately
protected. 212 As in agency law, the broker would owe fiduciary
duties to the principal-borrower. 213 These fiduciary duties would
police the relationship of trust that occurs when a borrower relies
on a mortgage broker to decode the complex information necessary
214
in order to purchase a home.
Ensuring that someone is on the borrower's side is the only
truly effective means of curbing unearned fees. This is specifically
the case with yield-spread premiums
because
indirect
207. See discussion supra Part I.F (analogizing the security industry's
requirements of disclosure and suitability).
208. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1329 (discussing the internal controls
utilized by securities dealers in order to comply with the disclosure and suitability
requirements). Best practices, or the most efficient ways to ensure compliance,
would be developed by the industry. Id. at 1338.
209. Id. at 1338-39 (explaining that a self-regulatory organization and suitability
requirements for mortgage brokers would generate best practices and compel
industry compliance).
210. Id. Recently, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has
recommended suitability requirements for life insurance and annuity products. Id.
at 1333.
211. See discussion supra Part I.B (describing deceptive practices, lack of
transparency, and harmful rent-seeking as common predictors of predatory
lending).
212. Engel & McCoy, supra note 46, at 1338-39.
213. See discussion supra Part I.F.
See also supra notes 133-134 and
accompanying text (detailing the duties owed by agent to principal under agency
law).
214. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (compiling all of the forms and
disclosures necessary to purchase a home).
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compensation is so hard for the borrower to even know about.
Disclosure alone will not work in the mortgage broker industry,
just as it was not enough in the securities industry. 2 15 And, like
the securities industry, suitability requirements are required to
truly protect the borrower. 216 Finally, the borrower who is
disparately impacted by illegal referral fees will reap the most
benefits because those people most disadvantaged by the system
will now have someone acting as their agent. History has shown
that this disparately impacted borrower will be female or
2 17
minority.
CONCLUSION
Beatrice Hiers' yield-spread premium paid to her broker,
resulting in over $10,000 of loan origination fees for a $159,750
FHA mortgage, would have been "reasonable" 218 and therefore
legal under the "total compensation" test.219 Conversely, under the
rule that the Culpepper court supports, Ms. Hiers' yield-spread
220
premium would have been illegal.
Transparency will aid the borrower in recognizing yieldspread premiums paid with no return of goods given or services
performed. However, transparency does not cure the illogical and
unfaithful "total compensation" test promulgated by HUD. In
addition, transparency may not cure the situation of kickbacks,
where mortgage brokers are compensated by yield-spread
premiums merely for referring the loan to the lender. Specifically,
the situation where a mortgage broker simply uses a rate-sheet
distributed by the lender to determine interest rates and is
compensated by a loan given above-par is not cured by
transparency. Rather, the "total compensation" test still allows for
post-hoc rationalization of the yield-spread premium. If the yieldspread premiums are paid because the mortgage broker is
referring business to the lender, and that relationship is
215. See discussion supra Part I.F (explaining why a suitability requirement was
necessary in the securities industry because it forced investors to work for the
borrower). See also supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (discussing why
disclosure is not enough and why the securities industry moved toward a suitability
requirement).
216. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the disparate impact of
predatory lending).
218. See Donaldson, supra note 8.
219. See HUD Policy Statement II, supra note 10, at 53,055 (detailing the
"reasonableness" requirement of the "total compensation" test).
220. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (explaining why yield-spread premiums
from the use of a rate sheet should carry a presumption of illegality).
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characterized by mere use of a rate-sheet of interest payments and
does not reference the borrower's particular financial situation,
even a transparent yield-spread premium may be a kickback or
unearned fee.
Mortgage brokers provide a valuable service to borrowers.
Sifting through complex information, explaining the homebuying
process to the borrower and then guiding the borrower through the
myriad of paperwork to the ultimate goal of home ownership is
important work. Suitability and licensing requirements would
provide legitimacy for mortgage brokers in the eyes of the public.
Changes like this would also go a long way toward curing the
disparate impact currently suffered by female and minority
borrowers.
Finally, by focusing on the borrower's financial
situation and imposing a suitability requirement on mortgage
brokers, the prevention of unearned yield-spread premiums can be
realized.

